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Abstract
Constitutional democracy in the United States emerged very gradually through a
long series of constitutional bargains in the course of three centuries. No
revolutions or revolutionary threats were necessary or evident during most of the
three century–long transition to constitutional democracy in America. As in Europe,
legislative authority gradually increased, wealth-based suffrage laws were gradually
eliminated, the secret ballot was introduced, and the power of elected officials
increased. For the most part, this occurred peacefully and lawfully, with few
instances of open warfare or revolutionary threats. A theory of constitutional
exchange grounded in rational choice models provides a good explanation for the
distinctive features of American constitutional history, as it does for much of the
West, although it does less well at explaining the timing of some changes.
1. Introduction: The King and Council in Europe and America
There is a sense in which all contemporary constitutional democracies can be regarded as
revolutionary forms of government. Parliaments were commonplace throughout medieval
Europe, but their members were for the most part members of elite families and served as a
birthright or were appointed, rather than elected. The locus of policymaking authority was
centered in a single royal man or woman and his or her appointed councilors. Prior to 1750,
there were no national governments whose policymakers were elected on the basis of broad
suffrage, and only a few city-sized governments with broad suffrage are found in historical
records. Only citizens, narrowly defined, could vote in Athens. Only the wealthiest voted in
medieval cities such as Sienna and Florence during their “republican” periods. Only a small
fraction of citizens could vote for the English House of Commons until well into the
nineteenth century.
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Nonetheless, the shift to democratic governance in the West was rarely sudden, nor did it
require a radical break with older institutions. Rather, new systems of governance emerged
gradually during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as long-standing political institutions
were revised a little at a time to take advantage of new political opportunities. Individual
reforms of similar magnitude had occurred before, but this time a trend to the changes
existed, rather than a random series of reforms and counter-reforms. At the end of this long
series of more or less peaceful reforms, a completely new method of choosing parliaments
emerged and a new assignment of policymaking power existed between the king and
parliament.
The order and details of reforms differed among countries, but were generally driven by
similar economic and ideological changes. For example, in Europe increased industrialization
and shifts in ideology induced political authority to shift from kings to parliaments and also
induced parliaments to became more broadly grounded in popular suffrage. This century-long
shift in the locus of political power was a major event in European history, although the
individual shifts of power and expansions of suffrage were often themselves relatively small
events. Nor were these two shifts of policymaking power entirely connected. European parlia-
ments had occasionally gained power in previous periods without broadening their electoral
base, which before 1800 were generally limited to well-organized and well-born elites. In some
cases, suffrage expanded more rapidly than power shifted to the parliament, as in Germany;
whereas in others, parliament became the dominant institution for public policymaking well
before universal suffrage was obtained, as in England. Yet the democratic parliamentary
governments of 1920 were broadly similar throughout western Europe and were radically
different from the previous governments that Europe and the world had known in previous
recorded history. 
The transition to constitutional democracy in the United States differs somewhat from
that of western Europe. There was another culture, the absence of an obvious king, a War of
Independence, little formal aristocracy, and little industrialization at the time that political
liberalization began. However, most of the difference is a matter of timing, rather than
substance. The War of Independence may have played a role in America's mythology and a
significant role in the emergence of national government; but it did not establish democracy in
one fell swoop, as is often taught to grammar school students in the United States. Adult
suffrage was not universal in the first decades after independence from England was won,
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although it was very broad by historical standards (Keyssar 2000). Moreover, the new consti-
tution did not revolutionize governance, but rather adapted well-established colonial forms to
national purposes. Those procedures were subsequently revised through formal and informal
procedures of amendment by both central and state governments.
This paper provides a public choice perspective on the emergence of liberal democracy in
the United States. Although the paper is motivated by rational choice models, there are no
equations in this paper. The relevant mathematics has been developed in several previous
papers, which characterize constitutional exchange and suffrage reform within divided
governments. Those papers note that political authority is multidimensional and demonstrate
that the tax veto power of parliament in combination with changes in political and economic
circumstances (and uncertainty) can generate opportunities for mutually beneficial
constitutional exchange among those with the authority to adopt reforms (Congleton 2001,
2007). The models also suggest that suffrage reform is substantially independent of the
balance of authority between parliament and the king, and tends to be driven by changing
suffrage norms and partisan interests, rather than changes in relative wealth or
industrialization (Congleton 2004a). The purpose of this paper is to show that the same
models that have previously been used to explain European and Japanese transitions to
constitutional democracy (Congleton 2007, 2006, 2003, and 2001) also shed light on
America’s transition.
Constitutional bargains do not always favor parliament or liberalization, but can lead to
agreements that gradually shift policymaking authority from the king (executive) to the
parliament in favorable circumstances. The first half of America’s transition to democracy
took place in the century and a half before the Declaration of Independence of 1776. The
transition to parliamentary rule in the American colonies is surprisingly similar to that of
Europe in the nineteenth century; although mobility and scarcity of labor, rather than
industrialization, induced constitutional development in what subsequently became the United
States. The second half of the transition took place during roughly the same period as in
Europe and was, like that in Europe, catalyzed by changing interests associated with
industrialization and the expanding influence of liberal ideology. (I use the term liberal in the
European sense throughout the paper. The distinction between American and European
usage is not important before 1900.) New economic and political interests created new
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opportunities for constitutional exchange, which in both Europe and North America led to
constitutional democracy.
2. Constitutional Competition in the Colonial Period
Colonization of North America began nearly a century later than in South America, in
large part because land rather than gold was the direct economic return for most investors in
the North American colonies. Land does not automatically produce income or wealth. Land,
unlike gold, is not portable and not valuable unless it is “improved” in some sense. Farming
requires clearing and tilling. Mining requires exploration, digging, and smelting. Timber
requires lumberjacks, saws, and sawmills. To profit from land holdings requires labor and
capital in addition to land. Consequently, those who received large land grants or subsequently
purchased large tracts in North America had a strong demand for labor and capital, because
without those additional inputs, their large land holdings were essentially without value.
Although many investors and land-grant recipients were nobles or members of noble families
who had enough wealth to provide much of their own capital, they could not supply their
own labor. Both skilled and unskilled labor had to be attracted to their colonies, towns,
plantations, and farms if profits were to be realized from their investments in the North
America. This demand for labor played a central role in the early constitutional developments
of the English colonies of North America.
Contracting Problems
To attract labor and capital to their colonies, the landowners needed to assure labor, small
businessmen, and other investors that they would be better off in their particular colony than
at home. Landowners and ship owners sometimes made extravagant claims about colonial life
to entice people to move to North America, as land developers do today; however, the most
common method of attracting unskilled labor were loans made to workers to pay for their
journey across the Atlantic and promises of support after arrival. Shipping agents and other
entrepreneurs provided transportation to the colonies in exchange for promises of several
years of labor, and those promises (contracts) were sold by shipping companies to landowners
needing labor. These indentured servant contracts also normally promised workers a
substantial piece of farmland after their transport loan had been worked off, which gave them
an interest in adhering to the contract and also allowed the servants to become freemen after
five to 10 years of hard work for their colonial masters. About half of the European emigrants
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to the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had their trips financed through
indentured servant contracts (Galenson 1986). In some cases, however, promises were made
and then reneged on after the “servants” arrived in America.
Such labor contracts were risky both for the indentured servant and the contract holder.
Once in America, indentured servants could not afford to purchase a ticket back to Europe if
their master overstepped the bounds of the contract or reneged on his promise of land at the
end of the contract period. Exit costs to other colonies were low, but not trivial, and in most
places natural exit costs were reinforced by local laws. Conversely, masters might have
difficulty with “runaways” whether they overstepped the bounds of the contract or not. Such
problems would arise in part because of fraud on the part of laborers, but also as it became
known that the promised land was not always delivered or of poorer quality than expected. In
the early days, many servants also died from various diseases before paying off their debt. 
Similar problems faced communities that attempted to attract tradesmen and the
tradesmen who brought their skills or capital to the new colonies in exchange for promises of
land or other support. People would be more willing to sign colonial contracts if the contract
terms were reasonable and if subsequent promises and accumulated wealth would not be
reneged on or expropriated. And, more people would provide such labor-backed loans if they
were likely to be repaid. 
In principle, such contracting problems can be solved through self-enforcing contracts, a
well-functioning court system, or a combination of the two. However, in the early days, court
systems did not always exist, and those that did tended to be biased in favor of major
shareholders in the various companies charged with development and in favor of associates of
the proprietors receiving the major land grants. Designing self-enforcing contracts in
circumstances in which time is an important element and courts are nonexistent or unreliable
is clearly problematic. Indeed, the worst indentured contracts were such that they probably
would not have been enforced in England, and the worst indentured contract owners
(masters) might well have been punished for violating criminal law. Attracting labor to the
New World required more reliable methods of enforcing contracts negotiated and signed in
Europe and protection for other property and civil rights in North America. 
Large landholders had a significant economic interest in developing methods for securing
property rights and enforcing contracts in the colonies. If economic and political risks could
be reduced for skilled and unskilled labor and for large and small capital investors, their land
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would become much more valuable. Institutional innovations that increased the effectiveness
and perceived fairness of colonial political and legal institutions would increase the flow of
labor and capital to particular colonies and thereby the wealth of large landholders. As in the
case of the medieval tax constitution (Congleton 2007), a decision process that protected the
landed gentry, capital owners, and labor from arbitrary treatment would advance the interests
of all.
The Virginia Experiment: Representative Political Institutions as a
Means of Protecting Property Rights
An institutional experiment based loosely on the English procedures was tried in the
Virginia colony in 1619–21. The Virginia company replaced its authoritarian system of
governance with a more representative one, which included: a governor, an appointed
chamber, and an elected chamber.1 
“THE one of which Councils, to be called THE COUNCIL OF STATE (and
whose Office shall chiefly be assisting, with their Care, Advice, and
Circumspection, to the said Governor) shall be chosen, nominated, placed and
displaced, from time to time, by Us ...” [The other shall consist] “of two
Burgesses out of every Town, Hundred, or other particular Plantation, to be
respectively chosen by the Inhabitants: Which Council shall be called THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, wherein (as also in the said Council of State) all
Matters shall be decided, determined, and ordered, by the greater Part of the
Voices then present; reserving to the Governor always a Negative Voice. And
this General Assembly shall have free Power to treat, consult, and conclude, as
well of all emergent Occasions concerning the Public Weal of the said Colony
and every Part thereof, as also to make, ordain, and enact such general
Laws and Orders, for the Behoof of the said Colony, and the good
Government thereof.” Ordinances for Virginia, July 24, 1621.
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1 The second charter of the Virginia company was granted in 1609, two years after the colony was
founded. Very extensive authority was granted to the company by the King for a period of 20 years
in exchange for payments to the crown. The Virginia company’s governing body was an appointed
council, largely consisting of nobles, many of whom remained in England. The company council, in
turn, delegated much of its authority to an appointed governor that made the voyage to the colony
in Jamestown, Virginia. 
A third charter was adopted in 1611, which gave the council significant legislative ability: “And
shall likewise have full Power and Authority, to ordain and make such Laws and Ordinances, for the
Good and Welfare of the said Plantation, as to them from Time to Time, shall be thought requisite
and meet: So always, as the same be not contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this our Realm of
England; And shall, in like Manner, have Power and Authority, to expulse, disfranchise, and put out
of and from their said Company and Society for ever, all and every such Person and Persons.” The
ordinances for Virginia adopted in 1921 clearly laid out the new bicameral representative
government for the colony itself. (Copies of the second and third charters and the 1621 ordinances
are available from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School.)
This template for governance solved many of the existing contracting and rulemaking
problems.
The Virginia model provided the crown companies, proprietors, or crown with
considerable control of the office of governor and the membership of the first chamber,
which consequently represented the interest of well-connected major landholders and
merchants. The second chamber was elected by town and country property holders and
therefore represented the interests of the middle class. Together, the veto power of the two
chambers protected the middle class and economic elites from each other and provided
similar protections for the proprietors. Changes in basic contract law, property rights, and
other civil liberties could be adopted only if they advanced the interests (of majorities) of all
three groups. In this respect, the Virginia model provided fiscal and regulatory stability that
was somewhat stronger than that noted by North and Weingast (1989) regarding England’s
parliament 70 years later (1689). 
It was this institutional template together with the mobility of labor and the interests of
large landowners that induced the emergence of relatively liberal forms of representative
government throughout the North American colonies during the next century and a half.
Gradual Liberalization of Colonial Governments
Although the Virginia template gradually became the standard one for governance in the
colonies, the other colonies also usually began with nondemocratic forms of government: a
governor and unelected council of advisors.2  Initial variation in colonial governance was
partly caused by cultural, economic, and religious differences. For example, Plymouth was a
religious colony founded by Puritans, New York was a commercial trading post founded by
Dutch merchants, and Maryland was a proprietorship (a colony initially purchased by a single
person) that encouraged Catholic immigration. The Plymouth (1620), New Amsterdam
(1624), and Maryland (1632) colonies all began with unelected governments and subsequently
added elected chambers. This was also the case in West New Jersey, which was founded in
1664 and in North and South Carolina (initially a single colony) founded in 1664. Charter
reforms were normally formally ratified in England in legal procedures initiated by colonial
governors. 
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2 See Salmon and Cambell (1994, ch. 1) for an overview of Virginia’s original authoritarian
government. See Lutz (1998) for a collection of early colonial charters and codes. Many other
colonial charters and ordinances are also available at Yale Law School’s Avalon Project:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm.
Within a few decades, colonial formeteurs found it useful to add elected chambers with
veto power over taxes and laws in response to labor mobility and yardstick competition
among the colonies. For example, in 1636 the Plymouth colony adopted a cabinet form of
government with a governor and seven-person council of assistants elected by freemen. This
was modified by adding provisions for equal protection of the law in 1641 and a bicameral
legislature in 1644 (Massachusetts). Maryland adopted an elected assembly in 1638, equality
before the law in 1638, and religious tolerance for all Christians in 1649. West New Jersey
adopted a democratic bicameral government in 1681. Its elected chamber was called the
General Free Assembly. New Amsterdam was taken from the Dutch by England and
renamed New York, but its religious liberties were continued and a new, relatively weak,
representative assembly was adopted in 1683. (Similar assemblies had been proposed during
the Dutch period, but not adopted.) Connecticut secured a charter that provided for an
elected governor and bicameral legislature in 1698. 
By 1700 a good deal of the architecture for democratic governance had already been
worked out and broadly adopted in the colonies. Consider for example, these excerpts from
the West New Jersey Charter of 1681 adopted nearly a decade before Locke finished his
influential treatise on government and before England’s Glorious Revolution. The excerpts
are from Lutz (1998): 
(i.) “There shall be a free assembly of the people for the Province aforesaid,
yearly and every year at a day certain chosen by the said free people of said
province, whereupon all of the representatives of the free people of the said
Province shall be summoned to appear ... to make and ordain such acts as shall
be requisite for good government and prosperity of the free people of said
province ...” 
(ii.) “The Governor of said province shall not suspend or delay the signing,
sealing and confirming of such laws as the General Assembly shall make...” (iii.)
“That it shall not be lawful for the Governor to make or enact any law or laws
for said Province without the consent, act, and concurrence of the General
Free Assembly...” 
(iv.) “That it shall not be lawful for the Governor and council, or any of them,
to levy taxes without the consent, act, and concurrence of the General Free
Assembly ... “ (v.) “That no General Free Assembly shall give to the
Governor, his heirs, or successors any tax or custom for any time longer than
one whole year.”
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Although the North American colonies were often founded for profit and often run by
chartered companies, they turned out to be great experimental laboratories of governance.
Indeed, the freedom to conduct constitutional experiments could be counted as one of the
great unexpected consequences of the discovery of the New World, perhaps the greatest in
the long run.
The Power of the Purse, Labor Mobility, and Constitutional
Liberalization
Colonial governors and their governments were not as powerful in the North American
colonies as in medieval Europe or as centralized as in the South American colonies. This was
partly because the North American colonies were less profitable than colonies elsewhere and
so were less directly supported by well-organized European armies, courts, and police. With
little or no standing tax revenues and with little support from English taxpayers or crown
companies, the royal colonial governors were very dependent on their legislatures for
revenues and often for their salaries. Governors needed reliable majorities in the colonial
parliaments to secure the resources for governing, which made the governors very dependent
on their colonial legislatures and also provided them with good reason to look for additional
revenue from the British parliament. It also made the colonial parliaments among the most
powerful representative assemblies in the world at the time, in terms of their control over
legislation and taxation.3 
The power of government was also constrained by the desire to attract new residents
(e.g., the demand for labor). Migration to and among the colonies was catalyzed by the efforts
of entrepreneurs in Europe and the colonies. Colonial governments, which often represented
investor interests, also attempted to attract the resources necessary for viability and company
profits. In the North, religious leaders organized groups to found new settlements to promote
narrow religious practices, although these leaders also recognized the need for additional
colonists to increase the viability of their communities and “spread the word.” Land
speculators aggressively sought labor and capital to increase the value of their land holdings.
Without relatively liberal political institutions, a colony's landed gentry might have a bit more
political power and “their” people might exhibit greater cultural uniformity, but they would
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3 The governor of the Connecticut and Rhode Island colonies were (indirectly) elected by the
colonists. Other governors held office through royal appointment or were appointed by colonial
companies and proprietors. 
have been less wealthy and more at risk, because there would be fewer persons to farm,
timber, mine, manage, purchase, and protect their land holdings.  
A poor or overly repressive colony or community was relatively easy to exit, because.
decentralized governance made it relatively easy to move to other towns and colonies with
somewhat different rules and rulers.4 Many of the colonies were physically close together,
because they were relatively small—as in the North with Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut—and/or were linked together by common waterways—as with Maryland,
Virginia, and Pennsylvania or New Jersey and New York.5 Ships ran up and down the coast of
North America, and the same rivers that allowed commerce to develop inland from the coast
also allowed pioneers to move from town to town. Less liberalization was evident in the
Southern colonies, in part because they were less dependent on free labor. Wealth
requirements for suffrage and office, for example, were somewhat higher.6
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6 European political institutions also evolved to increase the value of land, but in a situation in
which labor was not often scarce, given Malthusian labor supplies. Competition for free labor was
generally far less intense in Europe, because the supply of labor was relatively larger and its marginal
productivity was lower. However, there are several cases in which individual European monarchs
encouraged immigration of relatively highly skilled groups that could produce services unavailable
locally. Immigration was often encouraged with subsidies and by granting special civil and political
liberties within specific communities or “free towns.”
5 The North American colonies were independently organized and governed, rather than centrally
administered under the tight control of England. This was partly a matter of luck. The seventeenth-
century in England was a period of political turmoil, involving a major civil war, Cromwell’s
dictatorship, a restoration, and a Glorious Revolution. It was not until the decade before the
Glorious Revolution that the crown (James II) began centralizing governance in the colonies. He
initiated a series of lawsuits to revoke colonial charters. His success in court allowed him to issue
the Dominion of New England in 1685, which eventually placed all of New England, New York, and
New Jersey under a single authoritarian administration. James II appointed a single man to rule the
Dominion. Governor Andros, as ordered, restricted local assemblies throughout the Dominion and
reduced judicial independence by appointing new judges and suspending the Massachusetts General
Court. New taxes were imposed, and existing land claims were challenged. Enforcement of the
Navigation Acts was stepped up. Writs against the charters of Maryland, the Carolinas,
Pennsylvania, and the Bahamas were pending. If successful, the Dominion would clearly have
greatly reduced political autonomy throughout the English colonies in North America (Taylor 2001:
276–77; Haffenden 1958; Osgood 1902). This policy of centralization ended for several decades in
1689, when William III and the Dutch army induced James II to flee the thrown. William reinstated
several colonial charters and, with them, decentralized governance in the colonies. George III was
the next monarch to attempt to centralize control in the North American colonies, which more or
less directly induced the War of Independence.
4 The possibility of exit must also have moderated the behavior of other colonial governments
around the world with respect to their immigrants as well. But many were more profitable than the
North American colonies and, thus, they were better policed and exit costs could be driven higher
by local governments. European diseases had also greatly reduced the native “Indian” population,
which simultaneously increased the demand for colonists and provided many more opportunities
for resettlement (more open land) than in many other parts of the world.
By assuring stable property rights and allowing provision of needed public services,
representative political institutions tended to increase prosperity, a prosperity that tended to
be reinforced by subsequent inflows of labor and capital. A good deal of the population
growth was simply the effect of learning to farm in the New World and, consequently,
increased rates of survival and family size. But much of the commercial prosperity can be
attributed to the relatively rapid improvement in governance and government services. The
latter was often simply the rule of law and absence of impediments to trade (low exit
costs)—which contemporary research shows tends to increase economic growth (Gwartney,
Lawson, and Holcombe 2006)—however, the quality of government policies doubtless also
played a role (Keefer and Knack 1995, Congleton 2007b).7 The success of such relatively
democratic institutions was evident in the emigration rates, use of new labor contracts, and
economic growth. Major commercial centers emerged along the Eastern seaboard at Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Population and economic development increased
rapidly during the seventeenth century, and by century’s end the larger colonies were
comparable in size to the smaller European states in 1700.
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The colonial governments that emerged in the course of a century of competition,
bargaining, and experimentation were relatively liberal and democratic versions of the English
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7 It is interesting to note that many of the contemporary indexes of “institutional quality” can also
be used as indices of the “liberalness” of a polity’s political and economic institutions.
political template. As in England, the colonial governments typically included bicameral
legislatures with one elected and one appointed chamber, each with veto power over new
taxes and new laws. In the colonies, the appointed chamber was often an elite chamber
composed of senior government officials and major landholders and thus were analogous to
the noble chambers of European parliaments in that era, although membership was not
entirely based on family bloodlines. The elected second chamber was generally elected on the
basis of much broader suffrage than in European parliaments. The suffrage base of the lower
chamber tended to increase as the number of freemen increased through time, although
suffrage laws were occasionally tightened. Rather than 5 or 10 percent male suffrage, as was
common in Europe until the nineteenth century, colonial suffrage was often greater than 50
percent and occasionally close to 100 percent of adult males, because so many families owned
their own land and so met minimum property requirements (particularly in the northern and
mid-Atlantic colonies). This was a breadth of suffrage not reached in Europe until late in the
nineteenth century, a century and a half later. Electoral politics, consequently, became mass
marketing affairs in the North Atlantic colonies well before it did in Europe (in local and
regional newspapers and pamphlets). 
The combination of parliamentary authority and broad suffrage demonstrate that colonial
governments were well on their way to becoming parliamentary democracies well before
independence was declared in 1776. The association between democratic bicameral forms of
the “king and council” template and prosperity led essentially all of the North American
colonies to adopt them during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.8 This is not
to say that the colonies were modern liberal states, but rather that, by the standards of world
history, colonial governments were relatively liberal and democratic. Religious freedoms in the
northern colonies, for example, were often as limited as in Europe. In Massachusetts, Catholic
priests were subject to lifetime imprisonment. Even in relatively tolerant states, suffrage and
the right to hold elective office were often limited by religion as well as wealth (Fiske 1888:
76).  
3. Independence and Democratic Constitutions for the United States
The Declaration of Independence and subsequent war to secede from the British Empire
provided new opportunities for constitutional bargaining, experimentation, and exchange.
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8 By the time of the Revolutionary War, only Pennsylvania had a purely unicameral legislature,
although it too had briefly experimented with the Virginia model. 
There were new problems to address and important veto players disappeared. These created
numerous opportunities for constitutional exchange among those with the authority to amend
existing arrangements. The resulting constitutional bargains created the first sizable polities
grounded entirely in broad suffrage.
Independence and the Selection of New “Colonial” Governors
The Declaration of Independence had immediate and direct effects on the organization
of the executive branch at the state level. The royal and proprietary governors who had run
the executive, albeit subject to considerable control by elected colonial parliaments, lost their
offices. The remaining parts of government could have dispensed with the executive office,
but organizational conservatism and the advantages of executive administration prevailed, and
governors were replaced, rather than the office eliminated. 
Two methods for selecting governors attracted the most attention within colonial
legislatures, and both were used by subsets of the new sovereign state governments.
Governors could be indirectly selected by elected state legislatures, or governors could be
selected directly by state electorates. Parliamentary appointment is consistent with a
self-interest theory of constitutional reform, because this maximizes the parliament’s control
of the executive. Those favoring the direct election of governors focused on partisan
advantage and a mixture of ideological and historical concerns over unified governance.
Leaders of majority coalitions that expected to win elections for governor had reason to favor
directly elected governors, because independent elections would tend to provide them with a
relatively more powerful office than that of prime minister. Direct election of governors also
tended to be supported by normative theories of governance (ideology) that were widely
accepted within colonial elites and also by those fearful of what Paine termed the “vices of
government.” 
In the next few years, finely grained constitutional bargains were struck among idealists
and pragmatists (and those in between) within the pre-existing colonial legislatures, and later
various states adopted what would be termed “prime ministerial” and “presidential” systems.
Most states chose a prime ministerial system of governance. In only three cases did a majority
of the legislature initially favor direct election of governors.9 This is not to say that ideological
considerations were not evident. Most state constitutions were explicitly grounded in popular
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9 After 1780 several state constitutions were modified to include independently elected governors.
New Hampshire did so in 1783, Pennsylvania in 1790, and Delaware in 1792 (Fiske 1888, pp.
67–68).
sovereignty theories of government. Most of the new state constitutions also included lists of
rights. Most included provisions for broad male suffrage subject to wealth or tax constraints,
although in some cases suffrage was also limited by religion and race. No new constitution
mentions a state-supported church, although the degree of constitutional protection for
freedom of worship varied among the states. Some constitutions only protected open worship
by Protestants (North and South Carolina) and others by Christians (Maryland). Complete
freedom of religious conscience was assured by the state constitutions of Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Vermont. Many state
constitutions also explicitly forbade clergy from holding state offices. Only Delaware’s
constitution explicitly rules out the establishment of a state church.10 
1 Article 33 allows the possibility of supporting Christian churches using tax revenue.
2 Article 4 says that “all inhabitants of this Colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money” may
vote. This gave independent women the right to vote until the wording was changed two decades later (Keyssar 2000,
p. 54). 
3 An unelected second chamber (an executive council or cabinet) is chosen by the first (the assembly).
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Table 1
Characteristics of New State Constitutions Adopted Immediately 
after the Declaration of Independence
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10 Two colonies did not face an urgent requirement to rewrite their colonial constitutions, because
their charters had longed called for indirectly elected governors, Connecticut (1662) and Rhode
Island (1663). Connecticut continued to be governed under its colonial charter until 1818. Rhode
Island continued to use its colonial charter as its state constitution until 1843.
Source: State Constitutional Documents, Thorpe (1909). Also available from Yale University’s Avalon Project.
4 Article 9 states that “All male, white inhabitants ...  of the age of twenty-one years and possessed in his own right of
ten pounds value ... shall have a right to vote at all elections.”
5 Articles 7 and 8 characterize different rules for House and Senate electors, one can vote for the House if they have
paid public taxes.
6 In addition, the right to vote is limited by race and religion: “free white man, and ... who acknowledges the being of a
God, and believes in a future state of rewards and punishments...”
7 Vermont was created as a new state from land originally part of New York in 1786, a few years after its constitution
was written. It was, however, not admitted to the union until 1791.
8 Rules differ for the Senate and Assembly. Article 7 allows freeholders with more than 20 pounds of assets and renters
to vote for members of the Assembly if they have “rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings.”
Article 10 restricts votes for Senate to freeholders with wealth greater than 100 pounds. 
9 Article 38 of the South Carolina constitution includes a characterization of acceptable Protestant religious beliefs.
10 When different suffrage rules apply to the chambers of government, the most stringent is listed.
State Sovereignty and National Governance
 Before independence, an alliance of the colony-states was formed to coordinate and
share the cost of lobbying the British Crown and Parliament. After independence was
declared, the alliance was formalized as a treaty organization of sovereign states, somewhat
analogous to the old Dutch Republic and modern European Union.11 This first national
government was formalized and extended by the Articles of Confederation, which were
completed in 1777 and used for the next two decades, although they was not ratified by all
member states until 1781. The new treaty organization had to be acceptable to all member
states and consequently established a relatively weak central government that was essentially a
coordinating body with no authority to impose taxes and little ability to impose other rules on
its members.12
15
12 See Congleton (2004b) and Congleton, Kyriacou, and Bacaria (2003) for rational choice–based
theories of voluntary association among state governments, as within treaty organizations.
11 Articles two and three clearly indicate that the confederation addresses common defense
concerns and preserves state sovereignty. “(II) Each state retains its sovereignty , freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled. (III) The said States hereby severally enter
into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all
force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty,
trade, or any other pretense whatever.” 
However, Article 13 suggests that the articles are intended to create an organization that is more
durable and powerful than the usual treaty organization: “Every State shall abide by the
determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably
observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United
States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”
Governance under the Articles of Confederation proved adequate for a time of war, and
was able to pass significant legislation, such as the Northwest Ordinance governing the
admission of new states. However, it was widely regarded, perhaps surprisingly, as too weak
to advance national interests during the time of peace after the war was won in 1783. States
ignored requests for contributions to the central government, trade barriers were being
erected among the states, conflicts about the location of state boundaries were left unresolved,
and national defense was poorly financed and orchestrated. Secession from the confederation
was being discussed (Fiske 1888: ch. 4). 
A prominent group of state and national politicians believed that a stronger central
government would be necessary if the United States were to survive. Negotiations for a
stronger constitution took place in assemblies of appointed state representatives in Annapolis
and Philadelphia, many of whom had recently participated in drafting their state constitutions.
The national Congress accepted the recommended reforms without comment and the results
were sent to state governments for ratification or rejection in 1787. After much public debate,
the proposed constitution was approved by all of the member states in 1790. In this manner, a
weak central government was peacefully and lawfully transformed into a far stronger one.
The new Constitution substantially modified the pre-existing Congress of appointed state
representatives with a rotating presidency.  The new Constitution added a directly elected
chamber, a national court, and greatly strengthened the presidency. One chamber of the new
parliament essentially preserved the original Congress of state representatives, which helped
obtain the approval of the smaller states: the Senate consisted of two representatives
appointed by each member-state government. A completely new directly elected chamber was
a added to the central government, the House of Representatives. Its members were directly
elected by voters in single member districts (based on population) and had essentially the
same powers as the Senate. The rotating presidency of the old Congress was replaced by a
new, more powerful indirectly elected president, who also had veto power and would execute
the laws approved by both assemblies and serve as commander in chief in times of war.13 
The normative basis of the new national constitution was grounded in Enlightenment
theories of popular sovereignty, rather than the divine right of kings, the military power of
16
13 It is easy to exaggerate how centralized the new government really was. For the next century
and a half, the main source of government services remained local (town and counties) rather than
federal. It was not until approximately 1935, after the progressive amendments (see below), that
federal expenditures exceeded state and local expenditures. See Historical Statistics of the United States
Volume 5, 2006: Table Ea-A, pp. 5–6.
formeteurs, or long-standing informal and unwritten practices, as was also true of the
previously adopted state constitutions. Those drafting the constitution sought an
encompassing authority, but drew it from the “self-evident” rights of man, rather than historic
precedent or biblical citations, as might have been expected from the representatives of a
deeply religious society.14 The Constitution of the United States begins with the words "We
the people." 
Although it was not a radical experiment, the new national constitution was a significant
event in the history of liberal democracy. It created the first government of a large territory
that was completely grounded in elections with broad suffrage. It included a bill of rights that
would be supported by an independent Supreme Court.15 Its federal structure was scalable and
was subsequently extended to govern a far larger territory simply by creating new states. In the
next few decades, the representative democratic government of the United States
demonstrated that rule of law could be implemented by popular government and that more or
less moderate policies could be adopted by governments based on relatively broad suffrage.
Wealth was not taken from the rich, huge deficits were not run, and law and order was not
completely undermined by officials directly or indirectly selected by common persons. 
The success of this relatively democratic national government supported nineteenth-
century arguments in Europe about the feasibility of popular government. Such governments
had previously been intangible speculations of political philosophers or quite unusual forms
of city government studied by political historians. If the liberal political institutions of the
United States functioned reasonably well, perhaps the political ideas of the English levelers,
Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau were not impossible pipe dreams of idealists and scholars.
Perhaps, such ideas could provide an intellectual foundation for practical alternatives to
existing arrangements in Europe.16
17
16 The point here is not that the new government inspired the rise of European democracy in the
nineteenth century, but rather that the U. S. Constitution played a significant role in subsequent
political debate and reform in Europe by providing evidence that relatively peaceful transitions to
15 Several of the state assemblies and state constitutional conventions approved the Constitution,
subject to the addition of a “bill of rights” that more clearly characterized the bounds of central
government authority, as already found in most state constitutions. Twelve amendments were
adopted in rapid succession by the Congress to satisfy this demand. Ten amendments (the Bill of
Rights) were approved by Congress, the President, and the requisite number of state legislatures in
December 15, 1791. (Two of the original twelve amendments passed by Congress did not receive
sufficient state support to be adopted.) The first ten amendments are essentially part of the original
constitution.
14 See Miller (1991) for a discussion of the shift from traditionalist and religious theories of
democracy and community to liberal ones in eighteenth century America.
4. Constitutional Reform in the New Republic, 1792–1870
Constitutional reforms continued throughout the next century and a half, which gradually
transformed a relatively liberal representative system into a more completely democratic one.
The Constitution was formally amended more than a dozen times and informally amended
many more times. New territories were acquired, organized, and admitted as states to the
Union. State governments were reorganized, as governors became independently elected
offices with broader powers and elected second chambers were added (Benjamin 1985, Fiske
1888). The balance of policymaking authority within the central government and between the
central government and the states was continually debated and adjusted at the margin.
Suffrage laws were reformed at both state and national levels. The power of the Supreme
Court was increased early in the nineteenth century through its own decisions (Rhenquist
2001: ch. 1). Bargaining over formal constitutional reforms as well as quasi-constitutional ones
were nearly continuous throughout the nineteenth century, as was also true in Europe.
Although the constitution was sufficiently stable to serve as “rules for making rules,” neither
the process of adopting new laws nor the constraints on laws that could be adopted were
chiseled in stone.
Consistent with the models previously developed, the bargains struck reflected changing
economic interests, ideology, and preexisting institutions. Unfortunately, in addition to the
political effects of early industrialization, liberal ideology, and the inclusion of new states, a
problem postponed during the constitutional deliberations of 1787 led to a constitutional
crisis and another war of succession in the middle of the nineteenth century. In this case,
however, those attempting to secede lost the war, albeit at great cost to both sides. 
Perpetual Union or State Sovereignty?
Under the Constitution, slavery was a state regulatory issue, and support for or against
this ancient institution varied by region, because of the balance of ideological and economic
interests. In the northern states, where slavery was economically unimportant, abolitionists
pressed for its elimination, and slavery was gradually abolished beginning with Delaware in
18
representative governance could be undertaken, in contrast with the evidence generated by the
French Revolution. See, for example, Mclean (2004) for a discussion of effects of American political
theory on the French Revolution. Thomas Paine, quoted below, also provided intellectual support
for the French Revolution where he was charged with treason (as he had previously been by
England). Numerous constitutional documents and laws were translated and discussed throughout
Europe.
1776, Vermont in 1777, Pennsylvania in 1780, and Massachusetts in 1780. In the South,
where slavery was economically important (for tobacco, rice, indigo, and subsequently cotton
production), slavery was retained despite the efforts of Southern abolitionists. Abolition of
slavery throughout the United States became an increasingly important ideological issue in
Northern elections and consequently within the House of Representatives where
representation was determined by state population. 
In 1860, fearing that the national government would adopt new liberal laws on slavery
(which was not likely given the balance in the Senate) and other laws such as tariffs that
reduced their wealth, the Southern states attempted to secede from the union. The
constitutionality of secession was much debated in the period leading up to the war (Farber
2003: chs. 4–5). Articles 2 and 3 of the Articles of Confederation had explicitly guaranteed
state sovereignty on all matters not transferred to the Congress, although Article 13 had
committed signatory states to a “perpetual union.” The legal and philosophical tension
between perpetual union and state sovereignty, however, was not peacefully resolved through
constitutional bargaining. Rather, the perpetual union agreed to under Article 13 was
preserved by force of arms in the Civil War (1860–65). According to Lincoln’s interpretation
of the Constitution, sovereign states did not have the right to secede from a perpetual union.
Suffrage and the Civil War 
Suffrage law during the colonial period had been based on property holdings with further
restrictions based on civic status (free or slave), residency, race, and literacy. Who was or was
not sufficiently independent (a freeholder) to cast a meaningful vote differed among the
colonies (and states) through time, both before and after independence. After independence,
suffrage remained a state matter, and was gradually expanded in the early nineteenth century
as the definition of “freeholder” was liberalized and wealth requirements reduced. This was
partly a result of interstate competition for labor, as the new states often had more liberal
rules than the original colonies. It was also partly a consequence of changing norms and
expanding public education, as in Europe. More and more persons were deemed to be
sufficiently independent and knowledgeable to participate in elections. This shifting
ideological consensus is clearly evident in the Fifteenth Amendment to the national
constitution passed after the Civil War.
19
The Constitution was amended three times after the conclusion of the Civil War. This
was possible because of the prior secession of the Southern states and the military success of
the Northern states, which jointly produced a temporary exclusion of the Southern states
from self-governance and from the federal amendment process. A supermajority of the seats
in the Civil War Congress were temporarily occupied by Northern liberals and abolitionists.
As a consequence, three amendments were negotiated, adopted, and ratified by the states that
remained in the Union. The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) made slavery illegal17; the
Fourteenth Amendment (1868) defined citizenship in inclusive terms (all persons born or
naturalized in the United States) and guaranteed equal protection of the law to all citizens; and
the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) ruled out state laws that used race or color as a condition of
suffrage. In this manner, slavery was ended in the South, and freed slaves became eligible to
vote in federal elections. Other previously excluded persons in the Northern states also
received the right to vote and expanded legal protections. 
These were civil liberty reforms that were largely motivated by liberal ideological concerns
(the civic equality of all citizens), although they also advanced the short-term political interests
of the Republican Party, for whom the newly enfranchised were expected to vote. The
Southern states had to accept the amendments to regain self-governance, and all subsequently
ratified these amendments. After control over policy was returned to Southern state
governments, however, suffrage laws gradually became more restrictive, as various literacy
tests and fees (poll taxes) for voters were introduced to exclude former slaves and many other
poor persons from voting (Keyssar 2000). There was clearly no slippery slope to universal
male suffrage in the South.18
20
18 The 15th amendment did not create universal male suffrage, but eliminated race as a
consideration in who could lawfully cast votes in national elections. Other criteria could still be
applied, for example, wealth, literacy, and payment of taxes. (This overturned parts of some
Southern state constitutions and in this sense could be said to increase central government authority
over the states.) Poll taxes used in eight states, rigged literacy tests, and KKK terrorism also reduced
suffrage significantly both within working class and black communities. (It bears noting that,
perhaps as a consequence of the interests actually represented in government, the South
industrialized far more slowly than the North, and had slower income growth. After suffrage was
expanded in the late 1960s, per capita income in the Southern states began catching up with the rest
of the country.)
17 Slavery had been eliminated in most of Europe several decades earlier, as it had been in the
Northern states. It bears noting, however, that Southern slave owners were not compensated for
their capital losses as they were in many European countries. Slaves accounted for about half of
Southern wealth in 1860. 
Although the Civil War, like the Revolutionary War, attracts considerable attention
among historians and plays an important role in American political mythology, it was by no
means the only significant constitutional event of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Indeed, the war itself and its three associated amendments had a smaller effect on peacetime
national governance and public policy than many Progressive reforms and amendments
adopted in the half century after the war’s end.
5. A Digression on Economic and Ideological Developments in the
Nineteenth Century
There was no equivalent to the Civil War in Europe, but many other features of the
evolution of constitutional democracy in the United States paralleled developments in
Europe.19 The political and economic trends of the nineteenth century were direct and
indirect consequences of improved farming, industrialization, and urbanization and shifts in
political ideology. Ideological change was somewhat less evident in the United States than in
Europe, because there were very few “true” conservatives in the European sense. The center
of gravity of American politics had been liberal for a century in the sense used here, well
before the term was first applied to politics. The medieval order had few proponents in the
United States.20
Economic Development: Industrialization and Urbanization
As in Europe, North American society was undergoing a major transformation for the
first time in 10,000 years, when settled agriculture was being worked out. Both ordinary life
21
20 See Miller (1991) for a discussion of the gradual spread of liberal political theory in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century America. Miller argues that liberalism gradually replaced earlier traditional
(communitarian) and Puritan (Calvinist) political theories. The American version of liberalism was
influenced by these earlier theories and local traditions of direct democracy, as was true in some
parts of Europe (Lutz 1983). Consider, for example, this quote from the beginning of Common Sense
(1776) a widely read political tract by Thomas Paine: “This necessity, like a gravitating power, would
soon form our newly arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessing of which, would
supersede, and render the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained
perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably
happen, that in proportion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them
together in a common cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; and
this remissness, will point out the necessity, of establishing some form of government to supply the
defect of moral virtue.”
19 Perhaps the closest parallel  to the American Civil War in nineteenth-century Europe is the
successful secession of Belgium from the kingdom of the Netherlands that occurred in the 1830s. It
too radically changed alignments in the two separated kingdoms and, perhaps surprisingly, resulted
in liberal constitutional reforms in both cases during the next two decades.  There was, however,
relatively little loss of life, although some military conflict did occur (see Kossman 1978, part IV).
and livelihood changed for a majority of families. The use of increasingly costly, powerful, and
productive steam engines in manufacturing, mining, and transport, together with
organizational improvements, created new economies of scale in manufacturing and
commerce. The new steam engines allowed manufacturing to take place farther from the
banks of rivers than possible in the past. This was reinforced by rapid improvements in
transportation, which reduced transaction costs and allowed both inputs and outputs to reach
farms and factories further inland. Commercial networks expanded regionally, nationally, and
globally. Specialization and human use of natural resources increased as trading networks
expanded. Further economic development was stimulated in the late nineteenth century
innovations in electricity and chemistry (Gordon 1999, Nye 1990).
In Europe, realizing the rewards of technological improvements that increased the
efficient scale of production often required new laws to remove internal and external barriers
to trade. Markets had to be enlarged to warrant investments in capital-intensive production,
and changes in law that opened up internal and external markets were central to the policy
agendas of manufacturers and importers. For example, tariff reduction remained a central
policy issue for economic liberals in Europe for most of the nineteenth century. Their success
was evident during the first half of the century, as tariffs fell throughout western Europe.
International trade was less important for the United States, because free trade across state
boundaries was guaranteed by the Constitution and the internal market was very large,
although tariffs fell for the first half of the century in the United States, as in Europe.21 
Population growth continued throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.
Population growth in the United States reflected increases in arable land and improved
farming technologies. These supported large families and also substantial (net) immigration
from throughout Europe and subsequently Asia. Immigration was completely open during
this period, and new immigrants could often vote before they were citizens. (Passports did not
yet exist.) For the most part, these were economic emigrants who sought the opportunities
that relatively open markets and abundant undeveloped land produced, although broader civil
liberties also played a role at the margin. Emigrant neighborhoods were established in larger
cities, and entire regions of states were often dominated by particular immigrant groups.
22
21 U. S. tariffs rose in the second half, in part because tariff revenue was an important source of
federal government revenues used to pay off debts accumulated during the Civil War (James 1981,
table 4).
Newspapers were published in dozens of languages. New cities and towns emerged in the
West, and older ones expanded in the East.
Population growth was only possible because of a general increase in food output.
Agricultural technologies improved substantially during the nineteenth century with the
introduction of better seeds and plows, mechanization of planting and harvesting, and
chemical fertilizers. These techniques together with rising demand from nonfarmers allowed
larger, less fertile areas to be profitably cultivated, and farmland increased throughout the
century. As in Europe, however, an increasing fraction of economic output (value added) in
the United States was nonagricultural. Farm employment fell from 74.4 percent of
employment in 1800 to 55.8 percent of total employment in 1860 to about 30.7 percent of
total employment in 1910.22  
New production techniques allowed entrepreneurs to profit by selling old products at
lower prices than older smaller organizations could match. Economies of scale in
manufacturing and innovation led to creation of very large and profitable enterprises “from
scratch,” as “self-made” men became millionaires. Toward the end of the nineteenth century
many new factory-made products were introduced. As in Europe, intranational trade also
expanded, because more complete and rapid transport networks were encouraged by
government land grants and loans, as well as private investors. The resulting transport
networks reduced transactions costs throughout the United States’ domestic market (Taylor
1951, Wallis 2000).23
Urban population expanded more rapidly than did rural populations, which suggests that
life in the city was becoming relatively more attractive. Economies of scale and increased
specialization meant that more persons were employed to undertake narrow steps in more
round-about production processes. Many of the steps were often organized in large firms
based in specific locations. Urban life was systematically improving as new technologies were
applied and wages rose. Urban sanitation and transportation improved. Central heating was
introduced, followed by electricity, and telephones. People would not, of course, choose
23
23 There is some debate among economic historians about the extent to which improved transport
networks contributed to economic growth (Fogel 1962, Fremdling 1977). However, it seems clear
that reduced transport costs, improved information, and increased specialization tend to increase
economic output (Gordon 1999, Buchanan and Yoon 1994).
22 See  Historical Statistics of the United State Volume 2, 2006, Table Ba-A, pg. 2–18.  During the same
period, clerical and manufacturing employment rose from negligible levels to approximately 34.9
percent of employment.
towns over farms unless real incomes and/or other conditions were preferable to those in the
countryside. Per capita (average) income was rising throughout this period. From 1870
through 1920, per capita income more than doubled, as population tripled.24
Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century
The liberal movement of nineteenth-century Europe was a relatively broad movement
that included both economic and political agendas. Liberals pressed for a variety of reforms
that jointly ended what remained of the medieval political and economic order. They, for
example, included most abolitionists, democrats, and free traders during the first half of the
nineteenth century. In Europe, left-of-center and right-of-center liberals often cooperated in
their persuasive campaigns regarding trade and suffrage reform, also on electoral strategies.
This was less common in the United States in the late nineteenth century, in part because the
liberals already dominated the major political parties. 
As major elements of the liberal agenda had for the most part been achieved by 1880 in
the United States—trade liberalized, slavery abolished, equal protection of the law formally
protected, public education extended, and essentially universal male suffrage—policy debate
in the late nineteenth century increasingly tended to be among liberals, rather than between
liberals and conservatives, that is to say between “pro-reform” progressives and “laissez-faire”
liberals, who opposed further reform, but not a return to a class-based society. There was no
perfect equivalent of Europe’s nineteenth century conservatives in the United States, because
there was no legally sanctioned birth-based aristocracy, established church, or ancient political
institutions to defend. Disagreements among liberals, however, occurred on a wide variety of
issues including trade, regulation, woman’s suffrage, and social insurance. 
Tension between left- and right-of-center liberals was often systematic, which is why such
terms as liberal, radical, and progressive (social democratic) are useful for describing clusters
of policy positions in Europe and North America during this period. For example, the
Progressive movement and a short-lived political party of the same name can be thought of as
the American equivalent of the Social Democratic Movement (Party) in Europe. Progressives
24
24 Rising per capita income tends to be somewhat biased upward, as estimated in many economic
studies. The increase in the volume of final traded goods reflects both the increase in economic
output generated by improved technology and capital accumulation, and the substitution of trade
for household production. The latter implies that estimated income growth rates are somewhat
exaggerated; however, to the extent that persons could still choose to produce clothing and other
goods at home but chose instead to use “store-bought” cloth and clothing implies that a net
improvement in living standards was associated with this increased specialization.
were not generally opposed to private property or markets, but for the most part were
interested in “improving” market outcomes through institutional and regulatory reforms and
by equalizing bargaining power. In my terminology, most progressives were “left-of-center”
liberals, rather than “socialists,” as was also true of moderate social democrats in Europe.25 
It is interesting to note that the “left-of-center” liberals (the progressives) retained the
name “liberals” in the United States in the twentieth century, in contrast to Europe where the
“right-of-center” liberals kept that political label. For much of the nineteenth century, the
Republican Party represented left-of-center liberals and the Democratic party right-of-center
liberals, although this changed in the early twentieth century.
Politically Active Interest Groups of the Nineteenth Century
Many new politically active interest groups in the United States were formed in the late
nineteenth century. These groups often had fairly narrow policy agendas (interests), although
many of the groups had overlapping memberships. Newly organized economic interest
groups included regional and national business associations, trusts, labor unions, and farmer
cooperatives. Such groups mainly sought policy reforms that improved the economic
well-being of their members (profits, wage rates, and working conditions). Other interest
groups had explicitly ideological and political agendas, such as the temperance and woman’s
suffrage movements. And some groups had economic and ideological agendas, as with many
free-trade and labor movements. Groups lobbied for political and economic reforms as
matters of personal economic interest and principle. 
In general, the more likely lobbying groups are to play a decisive role in legislation, the
wealthier are their members, and the larger are the expected gains; the more effort members
of organized ideological and economic interest groups will invest to influence policy
(Congleton 1991). Per capita income rose, economic interests often increased, and techniques
for organizing large groups improved as specialization increased and the technology of
25
25 See, for example, (Prasch 1995, 1999): “What distinguished the economists associated with the
Progressive movement from their forebears in the liberal tradition was not their concern for rules
per se, rather it was their belief that a free market could be the locus of systematic economic power.
They thought that the proximate cause of this power was unequal bargaining power between
employers and individual laborers. It was their observation  that labor was typically constrained by a
lack of wealth. This simple fact, operating in conjunction with the need to feed oneself and one’ s
family, placed a distinct limit on the length of time that labor could “hold out” for a better wage
bargain.” 
communication improved. Consequently, economic and ideological interest group activity
increased throughout the nineteenth century.
Ideological and economic interest groups often join forces to lobby for or against new
policies and reforms; for example, labor and progressive groups often joined forces in the
United States. In Europe such coalitions led to the formation of labor and social democratic
political parties. In a polity with competitive elections based on broad suffrage, however,
interest group activities tend to affect the platforms of existing major political parties. The
Progressive Party did poorly in U. S. national elections, in large part because political
competition induced the two major parties (Democrats and Republicans) to adopt more
progressive positions on many issues.26  
6. Changes in the Economic Constitution of the United States
During the nineteenth century, there were several changes in what might be called the
“economic constitution” of the United States—which paralleled those of the industrializing
countries of Europe. A variety of adjustments were made in the rules that determined what is
owned and how what is owned may be used without legal (or political) interference.27 Many of
these adjustments were made shortly after independence was declared (Fiske 1888: 71), but
many more were made in the second half of the nineteenth century. Industrialization required
trade to become more open and property of all kinds to be more marketable and portable.
Property rights concerning physical goods and services often became “individualized” and
alienable, but they were also limited in new ways to take account of externalities and reduce
monopoly power.28
26
28 Changes in property law were more obvious in Europe and Japan where medieval family-based
27 Several of the original 13 states had previously “privatized” land that had been in the control of
the royal governors and proprietors after independence was declared (Fiske 1888, p. 71). 
26 The Progressive Party was founded in 1912 by former Republican president Roosevelt, partly
because he had failed to secure his party’s nomination as their candidate for President (on a more or
less progressive platform). Its base of support consisted largely of progressive Republicans and
independents. Many of its proposed policies were similar to those of the early Social Democratic
Parties in Scandinavia, and the party did best in states where Scandinavian emigrants were large
constituencies. In Minnesota, for example, the party received more votes than either of the
mainstream parties. It ran second to the Democrats in the nation as a whole on a platform calling
for a six-day work week, and eight-hour day in manufacturing, and prohibition of child labor at ages
below 16 years. See Davis (1964) for an analysis of the party’s platform and support. 
A People’s Independent Party had previously been founded in 1892, which represented
somewhat similar groups and interests and also drew much of its support from progressive
Republicans. See, for example, Webb (1993) for a discussion of relationships between populists,
progressives and progressive Republicans.
The territory of the United States had expanded in the nineteenth century through the
purchase of  Louisiana (1803) and Alaska (1867). Other territories in the Southwest were won
from Mexico during 1846–48. Most of this land was initially held by the central government.
To promote development, methods for transferring ownership of large blocks of government
land to individual families were devised and implemented, as with various “homestead” acts.
Many of the changes were similar to those involved in the European enclosure acts, as new
deeds were devised, roads and fences were built, and lands converted from commons to
private pasture and cropland.29 As in Europe, the rural landscape was transformed through
this combination of legal reform and subsequent economic development.
Although the homestead acts encouraged people to move to the countryside, relatively
more people were moving to cities than to the new farms, as noted above. The urbanization
associated with the expansion of commerce and manufacturing generated new demands for
public services and regulation. Demands for public services in cities increased with income,
partly because government services are normal goods, partly because some services became
relatively more valuable or less expensive, and partly because new services became available.
Expenditures on local public services per capita increased sevenfold (Wallis 2000). For
example, mass transit and public water systems expanded as towns grew into cities and as
existing urban centers grew larger. Public education was also expanded (mostly by local and
state governments as public school and state university systems were extended), and all levels
of government subsidized  infrastructure development in many ways. 
At the federal level, the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 transferred lands from the central
government to the states as a method of funding new public universities to be focused on
science, engineering, agriculture, and military science. Government grants of rights of way and
other subsidies helped private turnpike, canal, and railroad companies create a more complete,
rapid, and less expensive transport network.
27
29 The various homestead acts, with their very favorable terms for land sales demonstrates that
urbanization was voluntary in the United States, rather than the result of a shortage of farm land. In
Europe, urbanization in the early nineteenth century is sometimes argued to be a consequence of
privatization that evicted the landless, which induced them to move to cities as a last resort.
Involuntary urbanization can occur as medieval rights to commons disappeared. However, even in
Europe this was not always the case, because enclosure often increased demand for rural labor to
create new pasture from wastelands, drain swamps, and build new roads and fences.
privileges for particular occupations, products, and services finally disappeared as matters of law
during the nineteenth century. Debts often became individual, rather than family based, and land
became freely bought and sold. However, it is clear that property and tort law changed in the
United States as well. See, for example, Posner 2007.
Federalism, Ideology, Constitutional Law, and Economic Regulation
The increase in population densities and the size of firms, together with persuasive
campaigns led by progressives, also led to significant electoral demand for increased regulation
of economic organizations; new laws were adopted by many state and local governments.
Economic theory, however, suggests that interstate mobility and externalities limit the ability
of state governments to address effectively some of the problems that state electorates wanted
addressed. Partly because of such problems and organized persuasive campaigns, there was a
significant increase in interest group and electoral support for shifting some regulatory
responsibilities to the central government. 
Continuing debate about the proper extent of governmental regulation of market
activities and the constitutionality of such “ideal” regulations was evident in newspapers and
courts. The courts initially regarded much of the progressive legislation to be applications of
federal and state authority not supported by their constitutions. Consequently, some of the
new “progressive” economic regulations were initially blocked or weakened by decisions of
state courts and by the U. S. Supreme Court. 
The political and legal debates often hinged on right-of-center versus left-of-center liberal
arguments for and against regulation. For example, the Supreme Court’s Lockner decision and
dissent of 1905 demonstrates that the split between right- and left-of-center liberals occurred
in elite policy circles, as well as among politically active interest groups, political theorists, and
editorial writers.30 The majority opinion favoring Lockner supports the “right-of-center”
liberal argument favoring complete freedom of contract: 
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right
to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power. 
Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as
much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. There is no reasonable
ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person
or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the
occupation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified a a
health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals
following that occupation . . .
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30 Rehnquist, pg. 113-14 provides a short summary of “anti-progressive” Supreme Court
decisions.
. . . It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument, that it is to the
interest of the state that its population should be strong and robust, and
therefore any legislation which may be said to tend to make people healthy
must be valid as health laws, enacted under the police power. If this be a
valid argument and a justification for this kind of legislation, it follows that
the protection of the Federal Constitution from undue interference with
liberty of person and freedom of contract is visionary, wherever the law is
sought to be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Scarcely any
law but might find shelter under such assumptions, and conduct, properly so
called, as well as contract, would come under the restrictive sway of the
legislature . . . 
The minority dissent by Oliver Wendall Holmes develops the “progressive” argument,
which supported government regulation of some contracts and gradually became the
dominant opinion on the Supreme Court.31 
 This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as
legislators might think as injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and
which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. 
 Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A more modern one is the
prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he
does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a
shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the
post office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The 14th Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
In this manner, the policy debates between liberals and progressives became significant factors
in American policy and legal debates over regulation at about the same time that similar
conflict between liberals and labor movements emerged in Europe, although the debate on
adult male suffrage in the United State was essentially over (outside the South) by this point. 
Overall, the nineteenth century trend toward more liberal and open market-based
production and consumption continued into the twentieth century—with freer (but not free)
entry and trade possible throughout the nation and internationally—in conjunction with the
expansion of government services and new national regulations that attempted to restrict
29
31 See, for example, Rehnquist 2001, p. 107, who argues that Lockner was wrongly decided.
anticompetitive and fraudulent business practices.32 The persuasive campaigns undertaken by
progressives, together with support from economically aligned interest groups, produced a
series of new national laws that attempted to regulate large interstate firms and transactions.33
Examples include the Interstate Commerce Act, which regulated railroads (1887); the
Sherman Antitrust laws, which regulated monopolies and other conspiracies to restrict open
markets (1890); the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), which created the Food and Drug
Administration and provided for federal inspections of meat products and forbade poisonous
patent medicines; the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), which regulated “unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices . .
.”; and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914), which strengthened the Sherman Act and exempted
nonprofit institutions and organized labor from antitrust proceedings.
7. Left-of-Center Liberal Interest Groups and Constitutional Reform
In addition to their effects on economic policy, the progressives also pursued several
constitutional objectives. Just before the Civil War, a women’s suffrage movement was
organized, which gained members and support throughout the century (Keyssar 2000: ch. 6).
The women’s suffrage movement is part of the reason that the word “sex” was almost added
to the Fifteenth Amendment, which ruled out legal discrimination on the basis of race (see
Keyssar 2000: 178–79). The Fourteenth Amendment (which guaranteed “due process of law”
and “equal protection of the laws” to all citizens) was used in legal challenges of suffrage laws
that discriminated against women, but the challenges were unsuccessful, in part because the
legislative history of the Fifteenth Amendment was well known. Nonetheless, the woman’s
suffrage movement became a broadly supported and well-organized mass movement during
the late nineteenth century. In some states, support for women’s suffrage was sufficiently
broad for it to be adopted at state levels (Keyssar 2000: 203–06). 
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33 Many voters were skeptical of the ethics of the new industrialists in general, or at least a
significant subset of them, who were called “robber barons,” although the new millionaires rarely
resorted to obviously illegal behavior. (And also in spite of the fact that many of the new industrial
millionaires—Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, Edison, and Ford—established large charitable
foundations with large endowments. See, for example, Johnson 1997: 536–60.) 
32 Preexisting civil law had also included provisions discouraging fraud and monopoly that failed
to address the concerns of progressives. It bears noting that many of the new “progressive” policies
were subsequently used by large firms as new methods of reducing competition, although this was
clearly not what the reformers themselves had in mind. 
During approximately the same period, a “temperance” movement emerged that opposed
alcohol abuse and lobbied for new laws restricting alcohol access, production, and
consumption.  An American Temperance Society was organized in 1826. The temperance
problem was partly a consequence of the new urban lifestyle based on wages, rather than
household production, and the movement gained membership and political support
throughout the nineteenth century, as it did in Canada and Europe. Some of these
organizations were international in scope, as with the “Independent Order of Good
Templars.” And, it was often the case that the temperance and women’s suffrage movements
had overlapping memberships.34
8. Progressive Reforms of State Constitutions and the Bureaucracy 
A number of significant procedural changes in the fundamental procedures and structure
of American governance occurred during the “progressive period” that in many ways
paralleled those of Europe during this time. Progressive reforms occurred at all levels of
government, which demonstrates continuing majority support (among those who could vote)
for such reforms. Congleton (2004a) suggests that ideological shifts are necessary for
producing significant suffrage reform, and these may be catalyzed by interest groups.
For example, 19 state constitutions added (or included) direct referenda and recall
provisions, which allowed voters to decide specific issues, avoiding agency problems
associated with representative systems of government. These were mostly adopted by new
states in the West that received statehood after the Civil War, but several other states
amended their state constitutions to allow such referenda. Direct democracy continued to be
used in some New England towns throughout this period, although it had not formerly played
a significant role in state governance. Various forms of the secret ballot were adopted by
individual states. beginning with Massachusetts in 1888. Ballots were placed in official
envelopes before being placed in ballot boxes, which allowed votes to be cast without fear of
rebuke by their neighbors, landlords, and employers.35 
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35 Secret ballots were also known as the “Australian ballot,” because the rules and ballots were
heavily influenced by Australian reforms in the previous decade. Standard ballots were printed by
government and distributed at voting places, although several exceptions existed (Ludington 1909).
34 A temperance society was founded in Ireland in 1829, in Sweden in 1837, in Denmark in 1840,
and in Norway in 1845. Energetic temperance movements also emerged in Germany and England.
The temperance and woman’s suffrage movements in Europe are less studied, because they
operated in the political shadow of various men’s suffrage movements. See Johnson (1997) and the
Catholic Encyclopedia on temperance movements.
Bureaucracy was reformed to reduce political influence over career bureaucrats. For
example, the Pendleton Act (1883) established the U. S. Civil Service Commission, which
placed most federal employees on a “merit system,” greatly reducing the extent to which
political parties could determine jobs within the bureaucracy. After the Pendleton Act, only
holders of the senior-most jobs in the U.S. bureaucracy were appointed by the President. Such
“civil service” reform improves efficiency by increasing institutional memory and also reduces
the incumbent’s ability to use the bureaucracy in political campaigns for re-election, which
tends to increase political competition and reduce corruption. To the extent that job-related
skills are not highly correlated with partisan loyalty, merit based hiring also tends to increase
competence and productivity.
The suffrage debate, as in Europe, remained centered on “who is qualified to vote?” or
“who is a proper citizen?” as it had been since elected representation was first provided for
“freeholders” in colonial times. In the United States, unlike Europe or Japan, continued
debate about men’s suffrage was overshadowed by the woman’s suffrage movement.36 The
progressives, as true of most mid-century liberals, were not uniformly in favor of universal
suffrage (Keyssar 2000: 159). For example, Johnson (1997: 657) notes that the early
suffragettes had initially favored enfranchisement of only qualified women. Support for broad
women’s suffrage increased throughout the nineteenth century, and their eventual success in
pressing for reform of family and suffrage laws demonstrated that significant support for
broader civil liberties and adult suffrage existed in much of the United States.37 After 1900
several states adopted  women’s suffrage reform, after decades of persuasive campaigns by
“suffragettes” (Keyssar 2000: 208–12). 
These state reforms and the subsequent adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment are
consistent with the suffrage law equilibrium model of Congleton (2004a). In the absence of
32
37 Keyssar (2000: 168-69), argues that support for universal suffrage had waned somewhat toward
the end of the century, although it seems clear that support for woman’s suffrage increased.
36 In the United States, the men’s suffrage debate occurred largely in the eighteenth century and
first half of the nineteenth century, rather than in the second half of the nineteenth century as in
Europe, although black suffrage and immigrant suffrage debates continued throughout the
nineteenth and much of the twentieth century.  The men’s suffrage debate continued., but on a
smaller scale. This was evidently not a sign of disinterest, but of the general success of previous
efforts and disagreement about the final margins of suffrage: nonresidents, Indians, and criminals.
The new ballots included a list of all candidates rather than favored candidates. Paper ballots had
previously been used in several states. New York and Vermont used paper ballots since
independence. Heckelman (1995) notes that voter turnout fell as the secret ballot was adopted,
which suggests that vote buying was diminished by the new voting rules.
ideological shifts (which may be induced by persuasive campaigns inside and outside
government), suffrage law tends to be very stable, because the existing median voter tends to
be quite happy with the policies adopted through the existing political institutions. A majority
of male voters had gradually been persuaded that women were qualified to cast their own
independent votes.
9. The “Progressive” Reforms of the National Constitution
Three major reforms and one minor reform of the Constitution were adopted between
1909 and 1920. All of these amendments, as true of those adopted in Europe during this same
period, tended to “democratize” politics and extend the authority of elected legislatures.
The Sixteenth Amendment allowing income taxes was passed by Congress on July 2,
1909, and ratified by the required number of state legislatures on February 3, 1913:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever sources derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.
The Seventeenth Amendment provided for the direct election of senators and was passed
by Congress on May 13, 1912, and ratified by the required number of state legislatures (many
of which already used this procedure) on April 8, 1913:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures.
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited liquor sales. It was passed by Congress on
December 18, 1917, and ratified  by the required number of state legislatures on January 16,
1919.38 (This amendment was subsequently repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment in
1933.)
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or
the exportation thereof from, the United States and all territory subject to the
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38 Equally effective temperance movements were also active in Scandinavia during this same time
period, and the result was also often “prohibition.” For example: Norway, Finland, Iceland, and
Russia did go through periods of prohibition at about the same time as in the United States. The
Swedes transferred all sales to state stores and regulated consumption through a coupon system. It
can be argued that the Eighteenth Amendment is really a policy matter, rather than a constitutional
matter, although a constitutional amendment was required to put this particular policy in place
because the regulation of alcohol sales and production was considered to be a state responsibility.
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. The Congress
and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Holcombe and Lacombe (1998) provide statistical evidence that the pattern of support for the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments reflects state interests as represented in state
legislatures. Relatively low-income states favored the income tax, and states that had already
adopted direct election of senators favored the new method of organizing the Senate. 
The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Amendments were modest relative to the constitutional
reforms adopted in Europe during the early twentieth century, but they also significantly
altered the structure and resources of the national government. By changing the electoral basis
of the Senate, the central government became a less “federal” system of government. No
longer were state government interests in preserving state authority directly represented in the
national government. On the other hand, Senate voters were not subject to manipulation in
the manner that House voters were, because states could not be “gerrymandered.” Thus, state
results tend to be a more “honest” representation of state voter interests than congressional
district elections.
The federal government had relied entirely on excise taxes and tariffs for its revenues
before 1913 (with a short exception during the Civil War), because the constitution forbade
direct federal taxes—taxes borne directly by individuals. Although the income tax was initially
limited to the very wealthiest, it was gradually expanded to include most persons. Essentially
all contemporary central government (federal) tax revenues in the United States are income
taxes: the personal income tax, corporate income tax, and payroll tax (which funds Social
Security and Medicare). Income is a much larger tax base than “sin taxes” and tariffs and thus
potentially can support a much larger central government.
The Nineteenth Amendment added adult women to the electorate throughout the
country. It was passed by Congress on June 4, 1919, and ratified by the requisite number of
states on August 18, 1920.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
The Nineteenth Amendment, as was true of woman’s suffrage laws in Europe, extended the
logic of “qualified voters” to women. 
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Berman’s (1987) empirical work based on voting patterns in Western states and
McDonagh and Price’s (1985) work on Midwestern states and California support the
hypothesis that ideological considerations played a significant role in male support of
women’s enfranchisement (votes for Progressives and against Democrats). Both studies also
demonstrate that support for women’s suffrage among male voters was linked to other policy
agendas—in particular prohibition—which is consistent with an ideological model of suffrage
reform. In no case were women a serious revolutionary threat. Woman’s suffrage was adopted
throughout northern Europe at about the same time. What is unusual about the U. S. case is
the long gap between the major male suffrage reforms: the Fifteenth Amendment passed in
1869 and the Nineteenth Amendment passed in 1919. 
Together, the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments removed earlier
constitutional constraints on the size of the central government and increased the demand for
central government services. The Nineteenth Amendment did not change a fundamental
procedure or constraint, but did change the median voter.39 These were fundamental reforms,
whose effects could clearly be seen in central government expenditures. Indeed, the
“progressive amendments” could be said to be the first truly fundamental reforms of
American political procedures and constraints since the Bill of Rights amendments were
ratified in 1791. 
The progressive amendments indirectly affected both the relative and absolute size of the
central government for the next eight decades. Per capita central government expenditures
had been low and relatively stable in the previous 120 years and began to accelerate shortly
after the progressive reforms were adopted. State and local governments had been the main
sources of public services in the years before the “progressive amendments,” but this also
changed in the next few decades. Other factors were also significant; for example, during and
after the great depression and World War II, the central government began centralizing
responsibilities for social security and welfare and took a more active military role in world
affairs. However, without the income tax and change in the manner in which senators were
chosen, the required legislation would have been more difficult to adopt and fund.
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39 There is evidence that woman’s suffrage produced a new median voter with a higher demand
for social insurance than the previous one (see Lott and Kenny 1999). 
10. Conclusion: Summary and Extensions
With the adoption of woman’s suffrage, the United States could be said to have
completed a 300-year-long transition to constitutional democracy. It was a transition marked
by revolution and war, but it was rarely motivated by military events. External threats
catalyzed the formation of a national government in 1776, but its constitution(s) reflected the
previous century and a half of constitutional experimentation among colonial governments.
The importance of commercial interests, industrialization, and ideology in this process is
clearly evident throughout its history, which is consistent with a theory of constitutional
bargaining that stresses changes in the interests of those with the authority to alter
constitutional law, rather than revolutionary threats or severe crisis. 
In the American case, the rise of parliaments occurred for the most part in colonial
legislatures well before independence and well before universal suffrage. This part of the
transition reflected constitutional bargaining opportunities between colonial governors and
their parliaments (the colonial “king and councils”) in circumstances in which labor was scarce
and mobile. Suffrage, as in much of Europe, was extended to all adults well after parliaments
had substantial authority over public policy, although it was relatively broad even in the
colonial period. The transition to universal suffrage took nearly 300 years (350 if suffrage
restraints in the South are taken into account40). And although woman’s suffrage was adopted
36
40 Suffrage was not finally extended to poor whites and former slaves in the South until the late
within two decades, for the most part, male suffrage was extended slowly. Suffrage was
gradually extended to white men, former slaves, and women. There were significant periods in
which suffrage was subsequently restricted in all three groups, although the long-run trend
was toward expansion. Suffrage reform was driven, for the most part, by changes in the
norms that determined “proper qualifications” for exercising suffrage and partisan advantage.
Even the paper ballot was gradually introduced and reformed during much of the nineteenth
century.41 
The civil war allowed amendments to be passed that settled constitutional issues that had
existed for a century, but did not substantially change governmental procedures, although they
did extend suffrage and equal protection of the law throughout much of the United States.
Enfranchisement of former slaves in the Southeastern United States was imposed by northern
majorities on unwilling southern states after the civil war, and subsequently reinforced by civil
rights legislation adopted in 1960s. 
The parallels between reforms in the United States and in Europe are most striking
toward the end of this process, as secret ballots were introduced, bureaucracy was
professionalized, and woman suffrage adopted. During their respective transitions, the power
of parliament was gradually increased, suffrage gradually expanded, civil liberties were
generalized, internal and external trade was liberalized, slavery was ended, and public
education made more uniformly available. Most steps in most Western transitions to liberal
democracy were relatively small and lawfully adopted, although even small changes in
institutions can significantly affect public policy (Congleton and Swedenborg 2006). In this,
the United States does not differ from Europe, although its early institutions and some
subsequent bargains differ somewhat from those of Europe. Modern constitutional
democracy in the United States emerged at last at about the same time in the United States, as
in Europe, shortly before or after World War I. The gap between adult male and woman’s
37
41 Ballot design, perhaps surprisingly, continues to be controversial in the United States today.
After the 2000 election for President, many significant changes in ballot design and counting were
suggested, and a few were implemented. See for example, Agresti and  Presnell (2002) for a careful
analysis of the effects on ballot design on the distribution of votes in Palm Beach county Florida.
The “Help America Vote Act” was passed by Congress and accepted by the President in 2002.
1960s, although both groups had briefly been free to vote in national and state elections after the
civil war. Before the civil rights acts, blacks and poor whites in the Southern states often had a very
difficult time casting votes, although similar claims could be made about the latter for some
European countries in the years between 1925 and 1960. (For example, persons on welfare were  
often ineligible to vote even after “universal” adult suffrage was achieved in Denmark and Sweden.)
suffrage simply affirms the lack of a slippery slope to universal suffrage (Keyssar 2000,
Congleton 2004a).
The evolutionary basis of the constitution that frames the modern United States of
America is evident in its essential template for governance, which extends back to early
colonial times and in the long series of reforms adopted in the course of its constitutional
development. The contemporary distribution of policymaking authority within the national
government of the United States reflects the colonial experience and two centuries of
subsequent constitutional bargaining among the President, the Congress, and the states.
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